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NOTES
a transfer tax may not be levied by a state having jurisdiction only of
the person exercising a power of appointment, but not of the property,
its trustee, or the person or instrument creating the power.-0 3 A trus-
tee is not taxable by the state of his domicil on trust property outside
the state, if he does not act as trustee within the state.1sa
QUESTIONS NOT BETWEEN STATES.
As between taxing districts within a state the legislature may fix the
situs of property for tax purposes at its discretion ;1°4 so cases involv-
ing that problem solely need not be specifically considered.
Whether the same rules as to situs which are applicable to state taxes
apply also to federal taxation of property not in the United States, or
belonging to non-resident aliens, the few decisions involving the ques-
tion do not answer conclusively. An early case indicating that they
do apply'1 5 was reversed on a ground which did not involve that ques-
tion.10 In United States v. Bennetb-0 7 the court said that the restric-
tion of the taxing power of the states to subjects within their jurisdic-
tion does not apply to the United States, and sustained a federal tax on
the use by a resident citizen of a yacht never in the United States. But
this result could have been reached on the rule of taxation of vessels at
the owner's domicil as applied to state taxation, 08 and in a later case' 9
the court gave as a ground for upholding a federal tax on the income
of an alien from stocks, bonds, etc., that the property was localized in
the United States,-indicating that some ground of jurisdiction was
thought necessary. Probably the most that United States v. Bennett,
supra, should be taken as establishing, is that the doctrine of construc-
tive situs is applicable to federal taxation.
F. WARNER FISCHER.
SURETYSHIP DEFENSES BY CO-MAKERS IN MISSOURI
SINCE THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
I.
Before the adoption of the uniform Negotiable Instruments Law by
the Missouri Legislature in 1905, it had become unquestionably estab-
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. et al. v. Doughton, Adv. Ops. U. S. Sup. Ct
Dec. 15, 1926, p. 250.
'a Goodsite v. Lane et al., 139 F. 593 (1905).
' State Railroad Tax Cases, 2 Otto 575, 23 L. ed. 663 (1876) ; Columbus South-
ern R. Co. v. Wright, 151 U. S. 470, 14 Sup. Ct 396, 38 L. ed. 238 (1894) ; Adams
Exp. Co. v. Ohio St. Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 17 Sup. Ct. 305, 41 L. ed. 683 (1897) ;
Diamond Match Co. v. Village of Ontonagon et al., 188 U. S. 82, 23 Sup. Ct.
266, 47 L. ed. 394 (1903).
U. S. v. Erie R. Co., 9 Ben. 67, Fed. Cas. No. 15,056 (1877).
16 Otto 327, 27 L. ed. 151 (1882).
"232 U. S. 299, 34 Sup. Ct. 433, 28 L. ed. 612 (1914).
' See supra, page 4.
DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U. S. 376, 39 Sup. Ct. 534, 63 L. ed. 1042 (1919).
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lished in this state by a long series of judicial decisions that accommoda-
tion co-makers were to be regarded as sureties, and were entitled to all
the rights and immunities conferred upon sureties by the broad prin-
ciples of suretyship law.' One of these principles was to the effect
that the making of a binding agreement between the creditor and the
principal debtor, whereby the creditor for a valuable consideration
agreed to an extension of the time for payment of the debt without the
consent of the surety, operated to release the surety from his obliga-
tion.2 Others related more particularly to situations where the principal
debtor had placed in the hands of the creditor collateral security for
the debt. Because of his rights to be subrogated to such security upon
payment of the debt, the surety was held to have an interest in every
lien or remedy held by the creditor; the latter was regarded as in a
sense a trustee for the surety,3 and was not permitted to release or
voluntarily destroy any of these securities. If the creditor did actually
destroy or release any remedies which he possessed as against the
principal debtor, or returned security to the debtor or applied it to other
purposes than the payment of the secured debt, the surety was by that
fact discharged pro tanto, because of the loss of his subrogation rights.
4
It is the reliance upon these rules of suretyship law by co-makers which
the writer has denominated "suretyship defenses by co-makers"; and
it is with the status of these defenses under the provisions of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law that the present note is concerned. First, we
shall consider the situation with reference to suits by payees, and then
as concerns the rights of holders other than payees.
II.
The following are those sections of the statutes which are involved in
the question now under consideration --
Sec. 816, R. S. Mo. 1919; uniform N. I. L. Sec. 29: An accom-
modation party is one who has signed the instrument as, a maker,
drawer, acceptor, or endorser, without receiving value therefor, and
for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such
a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwith-
standing such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him
to be only an accommodation party.
'English v. Seibert, 49 Mo. A. 563; Noel v. Oberhellman, 20 Mo. A. 336;
Mechanics' Bank v. Wright, 53 Mo. 153; Hardester v. Tate, 85 Mo. A. 624.
'Noel v. Oberhellman, 20 Mo. A. 336; Fisher v. Stevens, 143 Mo. 181, 44
S. W. 769; Johnson v. Franklin Bank, 173 Mo. 171, 73 S. W. 191; Westby v.
Stone, 112 Mo. A. 411, 87 S. W. 34.
'Lower v. Buchanan Bank, 78 Mo. 1. c. 71; State Bank v. Bartle, 114 Mo. 276,
21 S. W. 816; Colebrooke on Collateral Securities (2d ed.) Sec. 239.
"Brandt on Suretyship and Guaranty (3d ed.) Sec. 480; 21 R. C. L. 1053;
Rice v. Morton, 19 Mo. 263, 1. c. 280; Taylor v. Jeter, 23 Mo. 244; Priest v.
Watson, 75 Mo. 1. c. 315; English v. Seibert, 49 Mo. A. 563; Brown v. Bank,
112 Fed. 901; Lakenan v. North Missouri Trust Co., 147 Mo. A. 48, 126 S. W.
547; Troll v. Daugherty & Bush R. E. Co., 186 Mo. A. 196, 171 S. W. 665.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol13/iss1/7
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Sec. 817; uniform act Sec. 30: An instrument is negotiated when
it is transferred from one person to another in such manner as to
constitute the transferee the holder thereof. If payable to bearer
it is negotiated by delivery; if payable to order it is negotiated by
the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery.
Sec. 838; uniform act Sec. 52: A holder in due course is a holder
who has taken the instrument under the following conditions: (1)
That it is complete and regular upon its face; (2) that he became
the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it
had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact; (3) that he
took it in good faith and for value; (4) that at the time it was
negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instru-
ment or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.
Sec. 844; uniform act Sec. 58: In the hands of any holder other
than the holder in due course, a negotiable instrument is subject
to the same defenses as if it was non-negotiable. But a holder
who derives his title through a holder in due course, and who is
not himself a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instru-
ment, has all the rights of such former holder in respect of all
parties prior to the latter.
Sec. 905; uniform act Sec. 119: A negotiable instrument is dis-
charged: (1) by payment in due course by or on behalf of the
principal debtor; (2) by payment in due course by the party ac-
commodated, where the instrument is made or accepted for
accommodation; (3) by the intentional cancellation thereof by the
holder; (4) by any other act which will discharge a simple con-
tract for the payment of money; (5) when the principal debtor
becomes the holder of the instrument at or after maturity in his.
own right.
Sec. 906; uniform act Sec. 120: A person secondarily liable or
the instrument is discharged: (1) by any act which discharges the
instrument; (2) by the intentional cancellation of his signature
by the holder; (3) by the discharge of a prior party, except when
such discharge is had in bankruptcy proceedings; (4) by a valid
tender of payment made by a prior party; (5) by a release of the
principal debtor, unless the holder's right of recourse against the
party secondarily liable is expressly reserved; (6) by an agree-
ment binding upon the holder to extend the time of payment or to
postpone the holder's right to enforce the instrument; unless made
with the assent of the party secondarily liable, or unless the right
of recourse against such party is expressly reserved.
Sec. 981; uniform act Sec. 192: The person primarily liable on
an instrument is the person who by the terms of the instrument is
absolutely required to pay the same. All other parties are
secondarily liable.
III.
The first Missouri case after the adoption of the Negotiable Instru-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ments Law in which a suretyship defense was pleaded was Lane v.
Hyder.5 To Lane's cause of action on the note signed by H. Hyder
and J. Hyder, the latter pleaded his discharge by reason of his being
surety on the note and of the fact that plaintiff and H. Hyder had made
an agreement for an extension of time for payment, based on a valuable
consideration. The Court conceded that before the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law this defense would have been good, but held that this law
abrogated said defense, for by Sec. 10161, R. S. 1909,0 defendant was
primarily, rather than secondarily, liable, and extension of time re-
leases a party only when primary liability does not exist. The opinion
was able to cite many cases from foreign jurisdictions in its support.7
This decision was followed by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in the
case of Citizen's Bank of Senath v. Douglass,8 which says: "Those,
who sign as joint makers and therefore 'by the terms of the instru-
ment' are absolutely required to pay the same, are by the statute made
'persons primarily liable,' and, therefore, none of them will be per-
mitted to show that they signed as sureties merely, and hence none
of them will be released by an extension of time." The Court's belief
in the soundness of its holding was reiterated in Night & Day Bank v.
Rosenbautn. In effect, the reasoning of the three decisions is as fol-
lows: Sec. 816, R. S. 1919,10 makes the accommodation maker liable to
a holder for value. By Sec. 98111 a maker is primarily liable on the
note. Therefore Sec. 905,12 rather than Sec. 906,13 controls the dis-
charge of his liability, and under it he is not discharged. This reason-
ing is in accord with the general weight of authority interpreting the
Negotiable Instruments Law, but is not law in Missouri today.
14
The Springfield Court of Appeals was first confronted with this
question in 1917 in the case of Long v. Shafer,5 a suit by the payee of
a note against the makers. All the defendants excepting Mason de-
fended on the ground that Mason alone had received the consideration
for the note and the others had signed merely as sureties for him, that
he had given plaintiff Long a deed of trust on 184 acres of land as
security for the note, and that Long had released 57 acres from the
lien of this deed at Mason's request, without consulting his co-makers,
163 Mo. A. 688, 147 S. W. 514 (K. C. Ct. Ap., 1912).
'R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 981; unifoin N. I. L., Sec. 192.
" Richards v. Market Exchange Bank, 81 Oh. St. 348, 90 N. E. 1000, 26
LRANS. 99; Vanderford v. Farmers' Bank, 105 Md. 164, 66 A. 67, 10 LRANS.
129; Bradley Eng. Co. v. Heyburn, 56 Wash. 628, 106 P. 170; Wolstenholme v.
Smith, 34 Utah 300, 97 P. 329.
8178 Mo. A. 664, 1. c. 689 (1913), 161 S. W. 601.
191 Mo. A. 559, 117 S. W. 693, 1. c. 696. This case is discussed in 8 St. Louis
Law Review 39, re accommodation indorsers. See also, as following Lane v.
Hyder, Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Rombauer, 194 Mo. A. 690, 189 S. W. 651 (K. C.
,Ct Ap., 1916).
"Uniform N. I. L. Sec. 29. 'Uniform N. I. L. Sec. 192.
" Uniform N. I. L. Sec. 119. 'Uniform N. I. L. Sec. 120.
"See 48 A. L. R. 715; Brannan's Neg. Inst. Laws (4th ed.) 361.
' 185 Mo. A. 641, 171 S. W. 690.
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who were consequently discharged pro tanto by Long's destruction of
the security which had induced their signing of the note. The plaintiff
acknowledged that under the law prior to the Negotiable Instruments
Law "it was competent to show by parol evidence that one who signed
a negotiable instrument ostensibly as maker signed as a surety, and
that the holder had knowledge of the fact, and that upon these facts
and proof that * * * the holder held any property of the principal
to secure the note, or other security for its payment, and without the
assent of the surety gave up such property or released the other se-
curity, the surety was discharged to the extent of the property sur-
rendered or the security released," but contended that this defense was
unavailable under the Negotiable Instruments Law, according to the
reasoning outlined supra. But the Court, by a vote of two judges to
one, reached a contrary conclusion to that of the other appellate courts,
on the following theory: R. S. 1909, Sec. 1000116 defining negotiation,
contains no provision which refers to the delivery of the instrument by
the maker to the payee; Sec. 1002211 stating the essential attributes of a
'holder in due course' implies the necessity of a negotiation to him, and
therefore no payee can be a holder in due course; Sec. 10028'- makes a
negotiable instrument in the hands of one not a holder in due course
subject to the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable; consequently,
for the purposes of the instant case, the defense was a valid one. The
Court refused to impute to the legislature an intent to change the pre-
existing rights of a surety without expressly so stating. The opinion
states:-
A note as between the original parties is like any other simple
contract.
In the hands of the holder other than in due course commercial
paper is subject to the equities existing between the original parties.
To hold otherwise is to deny parties, as between themselves, the
right to contract concerning matters nowise unlawful.
As stated above, this decision of the Court was not concurred in by
one member thereof (Sturgis, J., delivered an able dissenting opinion).
Because of this and in view of the sharp conflict between this decision
and views of the other Courts of Appeal, as expressed in Lane v. Hyder,
supra, and Citizen's Bank v. Douglass, supra, the case was certified to
the Supreme Court. Being confronted with these two contrary rulings,
and at liberty to choose either, that body, under the style of Long v.
Mason,19 expressly approved and adopted the holding in Long v. Shafer
and thus overruled the other two cases. In this connection, it should be
noted that the opinion of the Court is not the opinion of Railey, C., but
" R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 817, uniform N. I. L. Sec. 30.
" R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 838, uniform N. I. L. Sec. 52.
' R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 844, uniform N. I. L. Sec. 58.
" 273 Mo. 266, 200 S. W. 1062.
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that of Williams, J., concurring.20 Based on the reasoning of Vander
Ploeg v. Van Zuuk,2 1 it was held that plaintiff was not, and as payee,
could not be, a holder in due course, for those words imply a negotia-
tion to the holder, and preclude the possibility of his being the original
owner and possessor. Since Long was no holder in due course, the
note was subject to the same defenses as if it were non-negotiable and
parol evidence was admissible to prove defendant's suretyship and con-
sequent discharge by the creditor's release of security. One member
of the Court (Bond, J.) dissented from this decision, and one other
did not participate therein.
This Long case has been followed on all points involved by subse-
quent Missouri decisions. Among these which involve the rule deny-
ing the right of the payee to be considered a holder in due course are
Atkinson v. Kelly,22 saying, "Since the action is here between the imme-
diate parties whose names appear upon the instrument, the case is
governed by the rules applicable to non-negotiable instruments"; St.
Charles Say. Bank v. Edwards,2 3 holding that a holder in due course
must be one to whom the paper has been negotiated by indorsement by
the payee or a prior indorser; Martinsburg Bank v. Bunch et al.; 24
Schelp v. Nicholls;2' People's State Bank of Hartsville v. Hunter;0
Farmers' State Bank v. Schelin,27 which states, "We must proceed with-
out reference to the Negotiable Instruments Law. This suit is between
the original parties to the note, and hence all defenses that would be
open to defendants on any other form of written contract are open to
them in this case"; Weller v. Meadows,28 holding that "to be a holder
in due course the holder must have acquired the note by negotiations,
and transfer from the payee, or prior indorsee, and not by issue or de-
livery from the maker"; and, as recently as Apr. 11, 1927, Gate City
Nat. Bank v. Bunton,29 wherein the Court recognizes that its decision is
in non-conformity with majority rule and makes the following
statement:
There is great conflict of decision as to whether the payee of a
negotiable promissory note may, under the Negotiable Instruments
Law, be a holder in due course. Brannan's Negotiable Instruments
Laws (4th ed.) 361. The question was answered in the negative
by the Springfield Court of Appeals in Long v. Shafer, 185 Mo.
A. 641, 171 S. W. 690, and its holding was approved by this court
' That this is the fact has been judicially recognized in Newkirk v. Hays,
275 S., W. 964.
" 135 Iowa 350, 112 N. W. 807.
"214 S. W. 276, 1. c. 280 (St. L. Ct. Ap., 1919).
'243 Mo. 553, 147 S. W. 978 (1912). This case, although not mentioning the
N. I. L., was decided after its enactment.
' 212 Mo. A. 249, 251 S. W. 742 (St. L. Ct. Ap., 1923).
"263 S. W. 1017 (St. L. Ct. Ap., 1923).
"216 Mo. A. 334, 264 S. W. 54 (Sprfld. Ct. Ap. 1924).
"264 S. W. 427, 1. c. 429 (Sprfld. Ct. Ap., 1924).
2272 S. W. 85 (K. C. Ct. Ap., 1925). "296 S. W. 375 (Mo. Sup.)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol13/iss1/7
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in Long v. Mason, 273 Mo. 266, 200 S. W. 1062. Upon further
consideration we are not disposed to depart from the ruling there
made.
Concerning particularly the rule that parol evidence is admissible to
show that a co-maker received no consideration for his signature which
fact was known to the payee, wherefore the co-maker is to be con-
sidered a surety, the Long cases are supported by Producers' State Bank
v. Danciger et al.3° and Bank of Neelyville v. Lee.31 The Long case
was itself, of course, concerned with that type of suretyship defense by
a co-maker in which he alleges that the creditor has injured or de-
stroyed the surety's subrogation rights. Later cases of this type are
Martinsburg Bank v. Bunch and Boillot;3 2 People's Bank of Ava v.
Baker;33 St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Laughlin; 4 and Schelp v.
Nicholls.3 5 The last three of these cases were actions against indorsers,
but they may be cited here as authority inasmuch as, for the purposes
of those cases, the indorser who signed before delivery would apparent-
ly have been held to be under the primary liability of an accommodation
co-maker according to the Negotiable Instruments Law.
Despite the fact, pointed out in German American State Bank v.
Weston, that release of a surety by a valid and binding agreement for
the extension of time for payment and his release by reason of a
creditor's destruction or loss of securities upon the debt, do not rest
upon the same basis of reasoning, they may and should both be classed
together as suretyship defenses. Therefore, the courts have accepted
and applied the decision in Long v. Mason, supra, in its full effect to
cases where accommodation co-makers plead as defense the entrance
by creditor and debtor without his consent into a valid agreement for
the extension of time. See People's Bank of Chamois v. Smith,3 7 and
Newkirk v. Hays et al.," the latter of which expressly recognizes the
fact that Long v. Mason, supra, overruled the early trend of the cases
led by Lane v. Hyder, supra, and re-established to pre-Negotiable In-
struments Law.
Thus it may be seen that without question the doctrine of Long v.
Mason, supra, is the firmly established law of Missouri. However, as
pointed out in the Annotation in 48 A. L. R. 715, 725, this is the
minority rule in this country, both on the general proposition that the
Negotiable Instruments Law does not abrogate prior defenses based on
suretyship and the more specific proposition that the payee cannot pos-
sibly "hold in due course." But, lest it appear that Missouri stands
absolutely alone in its position on the matter, see the cases of Fullerton
Lumber Co. v. Snouffer,39 Howth v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 40
and Exum v. Mayfield.41
218 Mo. A. 39, 264 S. W. 1000 (K C. Ct. Ap., 1924).
m208 S. W. 143 (Sprfld. Ct. Ap., 1919). :See footnote 3.
in193 S. W. 632 (Sprfld. Ct. Ap.). *254 S. W. 844 (Mo. Sup).
N263 S. W. 1017 (St. L. Ct. Ap.). "99 Kan. 686, 163 P. 637.
"263 S. W. 475 (K C. Ct. Ap., 1924). "275 S. W. 964 (K C. Ct. Ap., 1925).
139 Iowa 176, 117 N. W. 50. , 280 S. W. 238 (Tex. Civ. App.).
' 297 S. W. 607 (Tex. Civ. App.).
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Since it has been decided that an accommodation co-maker's or
surety's rights are practically unaffected by the enactment of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, as long as the instruments are in the hands of
the payee, the same result must obtain when the note is held by any
holder other than a payee who is unable to bring himself within the
class of "holders in due course," because of failure to satisfy all the
requirements enumerated in R. S. 1919, Sec. 838.42 If, however, the
suit upon the note is brought by an indorsee who holds in due course,
a successful defense would be practically impossible, for in such case
it seems that no other course would be before the Court but to adopt
the reasoning stated above in connection with the discussion of Lane v.
Hyder, and to hold the accommodation co-maker liable to such a plain-
tiff, even though the latter has destroyed some of defendant's subroga-
tion rights. The opinion of Commissioner Railey in Long v. Mason
was an exposition of the rights of an accommodation co-maker as
against a holder in due course, but it was not concurred in by a ma-
jority of the Court. Of course, this line of argument was unnecessary
to the decision of the Long case, since the Court there held the payee
not to be a holder in due course. It is barely possible that if the Court
were unable to decide the case for the defendant on the theory which
was employed, they would look more favorably upon the theory ex-
pounded by Commissioner Railey. It was to the effect that the Negoti-
able Instruments Law makes no attempt to cut off the surety's equitable
right of subrogation, and therefore the defendants may "set up their
equitable counterclaim or cross action of subrogation, in bar of plain-
tiff's right of recovery." The opinion states -
The assertion of this right is not in conflict with any provision
of the Negotiable Instruments Law, but on the contrary, proceeds
upon the theory that respondents owe plaintiff the amount due on
said note and have an equitable claim of subrogation against him,
for the loss they have sustained by reason of the release to Helton
of the 57 acres of land from said deed of trust, which should have
been held for their benefit, as security for his indebtedness.
Only upon such theory as this could a surety defend a suit by a
holder in due course. There are no decided cases in Missouri holding
this defense to be a meritorious one; indeed, there is only one case in all
th reports which gives support to this reasoning. The defendant in
the case of Scandinavian American Bank of Fargo v. Westby43 pleaded
as counterclaim to a suit on promissory notes the plaintiff's destruction
of defendant's subrogation rights. A majority of the Court ruled this
to be a valid defense, drawing an interesting distinction between this
cross-action for damages resulting from wrongful acts of plaintiff and
an ordinary denial of liability upon the notes.
ROBERT L. ARONSON, '28.
"Uniform N. I. L. Sec. 52.
'341 N. D. 276 (1918), 172 N. W. 665, 1. c. 673.
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